MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. IT`S ROLE AND IMPORTANCE

Tiberiu TĂNASE, Traian OSTAHIE

Romanian Academy (tanasetiberiu2@gmail.com, tostahie@yahoo.com)

DOI: 10.19062/2247-3173.2026.27.31

***Abstract**: Counterintelligence and military security represent the main national effort to counter the actions of foreign intelligence services, of groups and political movements controlled from abroad, which are often supported by intelligence services, starting from infiltrating the synapses of strategic and operational leadership of the state and establishing the potential for engagement in espionage activities for the purpose of organizing subversive or sabotage actions. The first institutionalized information-counter-information structures were those of the army and not of other sister structures, which claim origins inconsistent with historical reality. These Romanian information structures appeared with the organization of the army, after the Union of the Romanian Principalities. The birth act of these military intelligence institutions was the date of November 12/24, 1859, when Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, through the High Order of the Day, no. 83, established the first staff structure in the modern military history of Romania, the General Staff Corps of the Army, which also included Section II, the first intelligence structure of the Romanian army, led by Second Lieutenant George Slăniceanu, assisted by Second Lieutenant Ștefan Fălcoianu.*

***Keywords**: Counterintelligence, military security, intelligence services.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Counterintelligence and military security represent the main national effort to counter the actions of foreign intelligence services, groups and political movements controlled from abroad, which are often supported by intelligence services, starting from infiltrating the state's strategic and operational leadership synapses and establishing the potential for engagement in espionage activities for the purpose of organizing subversive or sabotage actions.

When, at the behest of the times, the Latin adage - *Nefas est nocere patriae* - was chosen and proposed to be inscribed on the logo of the Directorate of Counterintelligence and Military Security (DCISM), the person responsible thought about the fact that the work of Romanian military intelligence, first and foremost, constitutes the first and most important belt of national security in peace, in situations of crisis and war. And one of its important objectives is to identify all the lawless who harm the homeland [1].

In romanian history, the first institutionalized counterintelligence structures were those of the army and not of other sister structures, which claim origins inconsistent with historical reality. These Romanian information structures appeared with the organization of the army, after the Union of the Romanian Principalities. The birth act of these military intelligence institutions was the date of November 12/24, 1859, when Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, through the High Order of the Day, no. 83, established the first staff structure in the modern military history of Romania, the General Staff Corps of the Army, which

also included Section II, the first intelligence structure of the Romanian army, led by Second Lieutenant George Slăniceanu, assisted by Second Lieutenant Ștefan Fălcoianu.

The presence of these counterintelligence structures was later formalized in military regulations. For example, in the Regulation on Internal Service for Troops of All Armies – A.15, year 1939, in art. 65 the attributions of the Corps Information Officer were introduced. He *"has the information-counter-information leadership in the corps and works on orders given by higher military authorities, under the supervision of the corps chief. He is informed about the true state of mind of the troops and officers, proposing necessary measures to prevent trends contrary to the interests of the state. He controls internal security measures, the secrecy of correspondence and the relations of the military with civilians. He works to discover, as much as possible, enemy agents and to hand them over to the competent bodies for prosecution. He receives and gives instructions to prevent the procurement of information and documents by enemy agents. He monitors and reports various religious currents, which through their ideas would weaken the morale of the soldier. He supervises military personnel reported as suspects, as well as any foreign person who, upon entering the corps, does not present sufficient guarantees of their good intentions. He supervises the execution of all provisions and orders given in connection with his assignment"*[1].

The regulation regarding counterintelligence training of personnel goes all the way down to the soldier. In art. 10 of the same Regulation states: *"every soldier must not only guard against spies, but also prevent any of their actions: either to learn news about the army, our intentions and plans, or to hinder the operations of our army, causing damage: to communication routes, telegraph lines, installations, warehouses, arsenals, or by propagandizing the interests of the country in order to shake morale and diminish our fighting power. The soldier must avoid discussing in public, or even in the family, matters concerning the army. When he sees that a person is unusually interested in matters concerning the army, or is spreading false news, in order to produce discouragement in the ranks of the army and the population, he must immediately report him to his hierarchical commanders, in order to put him under investigation; in time of war he will even arrest him and hand him over to the first command post or the first gendarme post"*[1].

The return to the traditions of counterintelligence activity in the Romanian Army took place after the December 1989 Revolution, this fact being recorded by the order of the Minister of National Defense M41/1990, the official act by which the Defense Counterintelligence Directorate was established.

The new structure of the Romanian military intelligence will experience a profound transformation process. Simultaneously with the expansion of functional attributions, the Military Protection and Security Directorate appears (1997), then the Military Security Directorate (2001) and, finally, the Military Counterintelligence and Security Directorate (2006), a name under which it still operates today. Thus, the Military Counterintelligence of the present has gone through profound transformations and transformations, most of which are determined by the standards imposed by the fact that Romania has joined NATO and the EU, becoming an important defense bridgehead of the south-eastern flank of the Euro-Atlantic space.

The essential mission of counterintelligence and military security activity is to counter interference and intoxication, misinformation, disinformation, counter propaganda in situations of peace, crisis and war, identify trolls and the spread of false information (fake news), etc.

An extremely important area in the field of military security threats is the Internet and the digitalization of communication, the high technology in the field of modern communication, which, in tandem, have multiplied, on huge spaces, the power of social media communities, facilitating instant communication through sound - image and the association of users in groups according to preferences and interests, some contrary to our security interests. The number of planetary users in cyberspace has generated various connections and the birth of communities (controlled by intelligence services and world power actors), which most of the time numerically exceed those in the offline environment [2].

The Romanian Army has transformed, improved and modernized its intelligence-counterintelligence structures in order to make it as difficult as possible for the adversary to steal the information it wants, while at the same time taking strict security measures for classified information, protecting its important strategic objectives and all its personnel, so as not to be vulnerable to the adversary's intelligence actions, whatever they may be. It should be noted that the missions of the counterintelligence arm represent the *"product"* of counterintelligence and disinformation operations, with a pronounced protective and defensive character [3].

The modern Romanian military *"Counter Intelligence"* makes major contributions to the management of knowledge through operational information of new Security Architectures and global, regional and national insecurity factors. DCISM is characterized by competent leadership and responsible management of information at all levels (tactical, operational, strategic), having exceptional leaders, with well-organized minds, leaders endowed with high capacities for analysis and synthesis, qualities among the most selected necessary for an efficient and successful management of the field of defensive military intelligence.

Since the establishment of Military Counter Intelligence, the emphasis has fallen and continues to fall on the relationship of the leader of strategic military intelligence with civil society and with other strategic military and political-military leaders, and the role of the leader of strategic military intelligence in the management and development of international cooperation has grown significantly, being permanently *"burdened"* by the three clear principles of any military intelligence service in the Euro-Atlantic space: need to know, need to share and need to cooperate.

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY THROUGH THE LENS OF SPECIALIZED LITERATURE

The principles of intelligence work highlight that an adversary will use all means, ethical and unethical, legal and illegal, to obtain information. To achieve their objectives, adversary entities identify, prioritize and select targets (individuals, groups, structures, organizations) based on importance, capabilities, accessibility, intentions, interests and vulnerabilities [4].

Stan Taylor believes that, in the context of dynamic and unpredictable international relations, decision-makers need to have information to protect national interests, which are at risk if adversaries create opportunities to obtain this information. In this register, an approach to counterintelligence activity as a component of intelligence activity is motivated by the fact that: decision-makers in a state have data that, if they were to become accessible to an adversary, would endanger national security; foreign entities target that data using methods specific to intelligence activity; the data needs to be protected by specialized structures so as not to become accessible to an adversary [5].

In this context, counterintelligence activity represents the use of one's own intelligence resources to identify, prevent and neutralize the intelligence activities of a foreign entity, providing an understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks generated by this entity, so as to determine the adoption of measures to prevent their materialization or to counteract them [6, 7].

For his part, Arthur S. Hulnick believes that counterintelligence activity is focused on countering a competitor's data collection efforts, and its essence lies in understanding and exploiting the adversary's dependence on information, being *"the intelligence activity dedicated to undermining the effectiveness of hostile intelligence services"*, in an attempt to protect one's own personnel, facilities/equipment and intelligence operations. Thus, counterintelligence activity focuses on identifying the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence entities, discovering, controlling and manipulating foreign intelligence operations, and is carried out domestically and/or internationally, focusing on foreign actions to infiltrate the state apparatus, espionage, subversion, terrorism, sabotage, respectively, penetrating the entities involved and analyzing enemy clandestine activities [8, 9]

Therefore, counterintelligence activity is focused on detecting and preventing, exploiting and manipulating intelligence activities or aggressions against national security by enemy entities (groups, organizations, states) [10].

Consequently, Michelle Van Cleave states that a distinctive aspect of counterintelligence activity is represented by the assessment of the capabilities of enemy entities to obtain national security information, respectively preventing and countering such actions [11].

In this context, Friederic Korkisch highlights that counterintelligence activity is considered a dimension of intelligence activity through which the intelligence gathering activities of foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorist organizations are counteracted or neutralized. The way in which counterintelligence activity is carried out is subsumed into the detection, identification, tracking, exploitation and neutralization of the intelligence activities of partners, competitors and adversaries [12].

In this sense, according to Stan Taylor, counterintelligence activity aims at:

a) ensuring the confidentiality and integrity characteristics of one's own information;

b) collecting data about adversary entities in order to prevent them from coming into possession of classified information;

c) collecting information about hostile groups or foreign intelligence entities, in order to prevent disruption or compromise of one's own operations due to penetrations, disinformation, etc., C. Wasemiller points out that the purpose of counterintelligence activity is to learn everything possible about the last two types of enemy actions and, therefore, about the people who carry out the action, without these people being aware that such data is being accumulated [5, 13].

Kaveh Moravej and Gustavo Díaz confirm the classic functions of counterintelligence activity such as:

a) collecting data on foreign intelligence entities and their activities, through open and clandestine sources;

b) studying and analyzing their structure, personnel, and activities and operations, but supplementing them with c) operations to disrupt and neutralize adversary activities, and Jeffrey Richelson completes them with d) investigating the individuals involved, and e) providing support for operations [14, 15].

For Frederick Wettering, these functions are: protecting secrets, stopping attempts by foreign entities to access secrets, identifying and capturing citizens who support adversary activities. Newton Miler (former CIA chief of operations) considers the functions of investigations and surveillance to detect and neutralize the presence of foreign intelligence services, collating information, penetrating, disrupting, manipulating, and misleading those entities [16, 17].

Arthur S. Hulnick believes that the intelligence activity cycle is applicable to counterintelligence, but that it also has specific sequences, which Michelle Van Cleave details: identification, evaluation, neutralization and exploitation of adversary activities [18, 19].

Subsumed under identification, Miron Varouhakis establishes a set of elementary activities, which would have the following dependent-successive advantages:

(1) understanding the organizational culture and behavior within one's own institutions;

(2) recognizing employees who pose a risk of being involved in illegal data transmission; (3) identifying employees in an adversary structure who could be determined to disclose information and would act as double agents;

(4) noticing management deficiencies, exploiting deficiencies in the structure and culture of the adversary organization [19].

For Arthur S. Hulnick, exploitation consists of the process of learning as much as possible about the adversary prior to initiating countermeasures. Gaining insight into an adversary's activities through analysis and information penetration facilitates and involves exploitation, as the ability to divert the directions/meanings of events and create advantages. Depending on (un)success, exploitation becomes a feedback mechanism for verifying/confirming perceptions, assessments, and uncertainties [18, 19].

Threat neutralization is embodied in:

a) destruction/destructuring of an espionage network by arresting or transferring a suspect to a position where he does not have access to classified data;

b) paralysis, through a specific intervention (for example, on communication channels) to determine the opponent to stop his actions to access the information of interest, to abandon the network or operation in order not to be detected. Paralysis is a preventive measure or part of an investigation (compared to offensive information penetration, destructuring and paralysis would be defensive).

Also part of the neutralization strategy is the cancellation of interest, which is achieved by inducing the idea that:

a) in the case of illegal information collection, the financial, political or other costs of detection are very high and that it is advisable to limit data collection by legal means; b) the targeted information is not valuable;

c) other data are more important (aspects that could also be part of a deception strategy).

Trust destruction involves configuring an event or set of events so that the adversary becomes dysfunctional to the point where he is detected or paralyzed to the point of inefficiency [21].

It is also appreciated that the effectiveness of counterintelligence activity is limited if the static phase of blocking the adversary's access to information of interest is not overcome and a disinformation program is not created, to induce confusion and erroneous perceptions in current or potential enemies.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY FROM A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

A first step in defining intelligence activity was taken by the Romanian legislator through Law no. 51/1991, on the national security of Romania, which specifies that this activity is a state secret and that it is carried out by the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Protection and Security Service. Correlating this definition with the provisions regarding the organization and functioning of these institutions results in a definition of intelligence activity, by referring to the fact that they organize and carry out activities for the collection, verification and valorization of information necessary for the knowledge, prevention and counteraction of any actions that constitute threats. [22, 23].

Furthermore, in the National Doctrine of Security Information, information activity is also defined as *"the set of operations and actions carried out by specialized, legally constituted structures, in a planned, systematic, unitary, offensive and secret manner, by using specific means and methods, for the search, collection, verification, processing and valorization of information regarding risk factors, threats, states of danger to national security, as well as for the control of their trends and developments, for the purpose of preventing, counteracting, eliminating them or enforcing the law, as the case may be"* [24].

The expression security information activity is retained from the document, which has the same meaning, but with the detailing of the activity cycle: planning-search-obtaining-verifying-analytical processing-informing decision-makers regarding the data and information obtained, relevant to national security [24].

- counterintelligence activity - *"the set of actions, operations and information-operational procedures carried out for the purpose of protecting information obtained by intelligence services and departmental structures, the means and methods of collection used, as well as the decision-making process against unauthorized disclosures and foreign espionage actions, the defense of institutions, their activities and personnel"* [24].

In defining the phrase *"ensuring national security"*, a doctrinal reference point is the national defense/national security strategies/doctrines, the phrase being found in the chapter on Transformation Priorities in the Field of Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security, from the 2006 National Security Strategy of Romania, being circumscribed to the objectives of prevention and timely warning of risks and threats, with the invocation of the principle that *"information ensures the avoidance of surprise..., decision-making power and speed of reaction as well as the capacity for pro-active action, in order to fulfill new types of missions"* [25].

The activity of intelligence, counterintelligence and security is also presented synthetically in the Guide to the national defense strategy of the country for the period 2015-2019 as *"a set of actions, operations, means, methods and specific measures carried out permanently by the institutions with responsibilities in the field, with the aim of preventing and countering risks and threats to extended national security, reducing/eliminating the consequences in the event of their materialization, protecting and promoting national interests"* [26].

CONCLUSIONS

The main mission of the defense intelligence activity is to obtain data and information about the military capabilities, strategies, policies and doctrines of the states and alliances of states located in the area of military and political-military strategic interest of Romania in order to identify and assess risk factors and potential threats to the national security of the state, of the North Atlantic Alliance, in peacetime, in crisis situations and in war.

Military Counterintelligence currently operates under the authority of the General Directorate of Defense Intelligence where, under the motto *Nefas est nocere patriae*, it continues to occupy the most important combat positions in a fluid and dynamic invisible front and to develop successful counterintelligence actions so that the most representative, credible and appreciated institution of the state - the Army, can fulfill its missions for the benefit of the homeland.

The dynamics of the structural transformations of the DCISM in recent years have been marked by a continuous adaptation of the personnel and internal processes to the global security equation and the strategic directions adopted by the leadership of the Romanian army. In this broad process of restructuring and modernization of military organizations, the defense intelligence activity enters new reconstruction processes, the goal being to obtain information about the military potential, strategies, policies and doctrines of the states, located in the area of strategic military and political-military interest of Romania, in order to identify and assess risk factors and potential threats to the national security of the state in peacetime, in crisis situations and in war.

The basis of the counterintelligence and military security activity consists in prohibiting the adversary's access to information, confronting his offensive actions, counteracting and neutralizing these actions. In terms of the repressive function, military counterintelligence is mainly concerned with detecting and apprehending foreign intelligence agents involved in espionage operations, identifying appropriate measures for protecting secrets through security procedures and methods, in order to prevent surprise, limiting the number of people who have access to different categories of secrets, regulating the activity of preparing documents and information media, and electronic protection against those who intend to procure secret and confidential information, by intercepting radio waves emitted by computers and secrecy equipment.

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